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REMBRANDTS IN THE RESEARCH LAB: WHY 
UNIVERSITIES SHOULD TAKE A LESSON FROM 
BIG BUSINESS TO INCREASE INNOVATION 
Kristen Osenga • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Universities are typically considered to have two complementary goals: providing 
education and performing research. 1 While the determination of which objective 
deserves primacy has long been debated and is not within the scope of this paper, it is 
indisputable that productive research serves to further a university's goal of education, 
both directly by adding to the body of knowledge to be dispensed to the students and 
indirectly by increasing the university's prestige, thereby attracting lucrative grants, 
quality students, and competitive faculty members to the university.2 It is, at the very 
least, safe to say that research is the heart of the academic system. 
Standing between a university and its goal of research are two basic, but sub-
stantial, obstacles: lack of funding and lack of access. Although lack of funding is 
fairly self-explanatory, a few statistics provide data on how important funding is to the 
research arm of the academy. Research is a generally expensive pursuit, with primary 
expenditures including equipment, materials, and labor costs. In 2002, an estimated 
thirty-six billion dollars was spent on research activities at academic institutions in the 
United States. 3 The federal government has long been the primary source of academic 
research funding, with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) providing a vast majority 
of the funds. 4 Although the government continues to allocate resources for university 
research, there are increasing numbers of universities, scientists, and projects seeking 
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank the staff of the 
Maine Law Review for organizing the Closing in on Open Science: Trends in Intellectual Property and 
Scientific Research Symposium, as well as symposium attendees for their helpful comments. I am also 
grateful to Michael Mireles for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. Finally, I would like to 
thank Abigail Smith (Chicago-Kent '06) and B. Wesley Barger, Jr. (Richmond '07) for providing excellent 
research assistance. Comments are welcome at kosenga@richmond.edu 
I. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure, in POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 295 (9th ed. 2001). 
2. See Madeyv. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that research universities 
engage in research projects that "unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business objectives, 
including educating and enlightening students and faculty'' and that these projects "increase the status of 
the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty''). Of course, some argue that the 
pursuit of research excellence may have a detrimental effect on the educative arm of the university. See, 
e.g., Daniel Alpert & Robert F. Rich, The Information Revolution: implications for Higher Education 
Policy, 2001 U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 291,296 (2001). 
3. National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, at 5-8 (2004), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/pdf/c05.pdf. 
4. Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey: FY 2004, at 14 
(2005) [hereinafter A UTM Survey] (stating that approximately sixty-seven percent of research expenditures 
were paid by federal funds in 2004); National Science Board, supra note 3, at 5-15, 5-17. 
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a piece of a finite level of funding, and of course, there is always the concern that 
other, non-research priorities may require a change in the government's distribution of 
funds. Because of the high, and often fixed, costs of conducting research, funding is 
a prerequisite to research. Decreased funding necessarily decreases the amount of 
research. The natural extension of this relationship is a reasonably settled principle-
decreased funding results in decreased innovation. 
While certainly less settled, as a matter of principle, the problems related to lack 
of access are perceived to cause no less of an obstacle to university research and the 
inevitable result of decreased innovation. Many scholars argue that the ability to 
engage in scientific research is hampered by the increased presence of patents issued 
on scientific building blocks and research tools rendering these resources unavailable 
or expensive and making research stemming from their use impossible. 5 Some scholars 
claim these patents exacerbate the "tragedy ofthe anticommons. "6 Other scholars assert 
the process that surrounds the acquisition of patents impedes access to the open 
dialogue and early accessibility of information that has been a traditional hallmark of 
the academy. 7 Yet others, in a criticism tangentially related to access, argue that 
university patenting alters the incentives for researchers, who will pursue potentially 
lucrative industry-supported research over "curiosity-driven research."8 This 
"curiosity-driven" research is assumed to more likely include foundational or 
theoretical research.9 Finally, the second obstacle, lack of access, may be exacerbated 
by the first, lack of funding. Patented inventions, if made available at all, may be 
licensed at supra-competitive prices, 10 requiring funding for licensing to be a line-item 
cost for a research budget, alongside the costs associated with equipment, materials, 
and labor. The argument follows that the access obstacle leads to a decrease in 
innovation as surely as does the funding obstacle. Innovation suffers when the 
scientists are not able to do research because the required technology is unavailable or 
expensive. The scientists are not as productive in their research because they are 
unable to build on the promptly-disclosed research of others and they are focused on 
commercial inventions that attract corporate funding rather than pure research. 
5. E.g., John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products 
and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 177-1 78 (200 1) ("[A ]s patents are used to stake 
out more territory for future research and development, there may be a decrease in the areas open for 
productive research unimpeded by existing patents."); Barry Hoffmaster, Between the Sacred and the 
Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the Moore Case, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 115, 134 (1992) ("The 
possibility of obtaining patents has already begun to cast a shroud of secrecy around science and has 
decreased the extent to which research materials and results are freely shared among scientists."). 
6. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 701 (1998). See discussion of the research anticommons, infra, at 
notes 32, 37,38 and accompanying text. 
7. E.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their 
Proper Place, 4 7 B.C. L. REV. 217,219 (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic 
Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1373-84 (1988); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77,79 (1999). 
8. Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, 16 
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECON. GROWTH 97 (2005), available 
at http:/ /ssm.cornlabstract=889207. 
9. /d. 
10. Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337, 341 (2004). 
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No study has yet definitively tied a decrease in research and innovation to the 
availability of patents to and exploitation of patents by universities. Even the first 
premise, that university patents cause a decrease in funds available for research and a 
decrease in access to essential resources for research, is tenuous at best. 11 I contend 
that the answer is not to eliminate university patents or diminish rights available to 
universities in their intellectual property, 12 but rather to encourage universities to view 
and exploit their intellectual property assets like a savvy business enterprise would. 
In fact, the obstacles related to lack of funding and lack of access may actually be 
mitigated by university patenting, if universities start obtaining and using their patents 
strategically. It should follow that by removing obstacles to university research, the 
level of activity and thus innovation should actually increase. While big business did 
not initially embrace patenting and, in fact, shared many of the same barriers that 
universities express with respect to entering the intellectual property arena, studies 
have regularly shown that both patenting by businesses and innovation are rising. 13 
To be fair, the business world has not always been so patent savvy; the volume of 
intellectual property acquisition and exploitation in the business world today 
exponentially eclipses that of the past. Although other reasons may have contributed 
to their reluctance to journey into the patent arena, big business certainly experienced 
some level of unwillingness or disinterest in jumping full force into patenting, citing 
lack of money, lack of knowledge, lack of infrastructure, and concern about upsetting 
the research and development culture of the firm. 14 Some companies in the business 
world waited until they were on the defensive end of an intellectual property lawsuit 
to embrace a patent strategy of their own.15 Others witnessed intellectual property 
being used beneficially (or perhaps witnessed second-hand the liabilities that come 
from not having patents) and proactively adopted an intellectual property strategy. 16 
Fortunately, in most sectors of business, patents are viewed favorably, and a business 
contemplating jumping into the intellectual property arena need not look far for 
guidance. For example, in one recent book aimed at the business executive audience, 
Kevin Rivette and David Kline, authors of Rembrandts in the Attic, explain the 
importance of intellectual property in today's world and impart guidance for 
developing an intellectual property strategy to maximize profits and promote 
innovation in the firm, basically providing business with a primer of how and why to 
II. There are some studies that suggest a relationship between an anticommons effect and university 
licensing activity. See Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: California, 
Parents and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1133, 1166-68 (2006). 
12. Although the term "intellectual property" encompasses at least patents, trademarks, and copyrights, 
I am using this term to specifically connote patents in this Article. The ability of a university to increase 
its revenue stream through careful management and exploitation of its trademarks and copyrights, while 
interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
13. E.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77,78 (2002) (noting an increase in the amount of patenting and the amount of 
innovation). 
14. KEVIN G. RNEITE& DAVID KLEIN, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATIIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE 
OF PATENTS 37-42 (2000). 
15. !d. at 45-46. 
16. !d. 
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accept intellectual property as the new currency. 17 The experience of big business in 
the patent world has been positive-research, innovation, and revenue attributable to 
intellectual property are all on the upswing. 18 
It would seem that university patenting would produce similar positive results for 
research and innovation (and in a domino fashion, perhaps, for revenue) following the 
general trend seen by business. While universities are relative newcomers to the patent 
world, one benefit is that they do not need to reinvent the wheel. Although there are 
certainly issues that are unique to universities, the barriers to entering and participating 
in the intellectual property arena are very similar: lack of money, lack of knowledge, 
lack of infrastructure, and concern about upsetting the culture of academic research. 
In fact, even the concerns that are unique to universities are, at bottom, variations on 
the same barriers that businesses face. For example, the wide variety of subject matter 
being researched at universities may be unique to academia, but at its essence, the 
barrier is in providing an infrastructure equipped to handle such diversity. Similarly, 
academic freedom adds a certain twist to the research and development culture, but 
there exist similar cultural barriers in industry, as evidenced by the open source 
movement. Thus, a university can and should look to and adapt the guidance and 
experience of big business to organize and implement an intellectual property 
management scheme, hopefully to achieve similar positive results. 
In this Article, I argue that patents, if obtained and exploited strategically, can 
have a beneficial effect on university research. I will describe the barriers to university 
participation in the patent arena-that is, lack of money, lack of knowledge, lack of 
infrastructure, and cultural concerns-and explain, with reference to business, how and 
why universities need to overcome these barriers. By breaking down these barriers and 
ably exploiting their intellectual property, I argue that the obstacles to university 
research will be lessened, resulting in increased research and innovation. I further 
provide a primer to provide university administrators, technology transfer offices, and 
researchers with the information necessary to understand at least the "whys" of 
obtaining patents and an initial "how" for exploiting and maximizing the use of these 
patents. With reference to the patent management strategies provided by the authors 
of Rembrandts in the Attic, I argue that these can be adapted to address the barriers to 
the university patenting, as well as show how a coherent patent strategy can set up the 
university to overcome the obstacles of lack of access and lack of funding. 
In particular, I will address the knowledge barrier faced by universities seeking to 
obtain and exploit their intellectual property rights. With this knowledge, the 
university can begin to overcome the other barriers, such as lack of money and cultural 
concerns. To further this goal, I propose implementing an infrastructure to facilitate 
the ability of universities to put into practice the suggestions inspired by Rembrandts 
in the Attic, as adapted for universities. This infrastructure includes an entity that will 
act as both an aggregator and analyst and will work in conjunction with a modified 
version of university technology transfer offices, addressing both the knowledge and 
infrastructure barriers. The modifications proposed for technology transfer offices are 
directed, in alternate part, towards removing the cultural barrier between researchers 
17. See generally, RIVEITE & KLEIN, supra note 14. 
18. See id. at 4-13. 
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and patenting. The final barrier, lack of money, is intimately tied to the lack of funding 
obstacle. In theory, an appropriate patent management strategy will lead to increased 
revenue streams and potential lines of funding, which will alleviate both of these 
concerns. Finally, the infrastructure suggested includes provisions to address the 
access obstacle (and concurrently the cultural barrier), which also should be mitigated 
by the impartation of knowledge and the increased potential for funding. 
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the problems of university patenting in more 
detail. In particular, I review the literature directed to the obstacles related to lack of 
funding and lack of access, paying special attention to the role of patenting by the 
universities. In Part III, I determine what businesses know that universities do not, 
based on the principles and strategies from Rembrandts in the Attic. In Part IV, I adopt 
and apply these principles and strategies to the university setting and propose an 
infrastructure for implementing these ideas. I explain how this proposal breaks down 
the barriers to entering the patent arena, overcomes or at least lessens the obstacles of 
lack of access and lack of funding, and ultimately leads to increased research and 
innovation. I conclude that universities should adopt a mindset more akin to big 
business when considering their intellectual property resources, thereby alleviating the 
access and funding obstacles, resulting in greater research and innovation. 
II. UNNERSITY PATENTING--WHAT'S THE PROBLEM? 
When considering university patenting, three sequential questions come to mind. 
First, can a university own patents? Second, should a university own patents? And 
third, what should a university do with its patents? Although the first question has 
been answered in the affirmative by Congress in enacting the Bayh-Dole Act, 19 the 
remaining two questions remain the topic of extensive debate. 
A. Universities as Patent Owners 
For much of recent history, and due to the peculiar involvement of the government 
in funding most university research, it was unclear whether universities could even own 
patents. Although the federal government had been allocating money to scientific 
research prior, in the 1940s the government recognized that research conducted by 
academic institutions may represent the greatest opportunity for scientific advancement 
and, as a result, began to provide funding in the form of grants in 1946.20 That year, 
the Office ofNaval Research and the NIH were created, followed shortly by the NSF, 
with the purpose of overseeing the allocation and use of federal funds for scientific 
research.21 Each of these agencies, as well as others instituted later, had different 
standards for ownership in inventions created with the provided funds. Worse still, 
some patent policy was determined not on an agency level, or even research institution 
19. The Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures (Bayh-Do1e) Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,94 
Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2007)) [hereinafter Bayh-Dole Act]. 
20. Kenneth S. Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed 
Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 459-60 (1997). 
21. /d. at 460. 
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level, but on an ad hoc basis depending on the particular invention in question.22 The 
result was unclear ownership of inventions supported in full or part by government 
grant monies. In some cases, where the federal government took title to the invention, 
the patents were rarely, if ever, licensed, in part due to the bureaucratic red tape 
involved.23 In fact, studies indicate that only about four percent of patents issued for 
inventions funded by NASA, the DOD, and the NIH were ever used.24 The bottom line 
was that the very scientific research the government was trying to promote via federal 
funding was instead then simply shelved, unused. 
To address this problem, Congress, in 1980, passed the Bayh-Dole Act, having the 
stated purpose of promoting the utilization of federally-funded inventions.25 
Specifically, the Act aims: 
to promote the utilization of inventions ... ; to encourage maximum participation of 
small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to 
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, 
including universities; [and] to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit 
organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery 
26 
To accomplish these objectives and prevent inventions based on federally-funded 
research from laying fallow and unused, the Act permits the inventing university to 
take title in the resulting invention.27 The relevant requirements of the Act are rather 
simple: the university must disclose the invention to the federal government within a 
reasonable time; inform the government of its intent to patent the subject invention; 
retain title of the invention; share licensing proceeds with the inventors; and use the 
remaining licensing income to support further research or education.28 With the patent 
in the hands of the university, it is hoped the invention will be used and licensed, more 
so than it would have been if the government had title.29 To protect the government's 
interest, the Act also contains a provision granting a paid-up license to the federal 
government, such that neither the federal government nor its contractors can be liable 
for infringing an invention created using federal research funds. 30 
22. Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 399 (2006). 
23. Dueker, supra note 20, at 460. 
24. Pulsinelli, supra note 22, at 397. This low number, however, may be the result of selection bias 
in the government-sponsored patents surveyed. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1663, 1679-80 ( 1996). 
25. 35 u.s.c. § 200 (2007). 
26. !d. 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
28. !d. § 202(c). 
29. Other articles have investigated the efficacy of the Bayh-Dole Act in reaching its objectives. See, 
e.g., Pulsinelli, supra note 22; Eisenberg, supra note 24. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). 
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B. Criticisms of Bayh-Dole and the Problems of University Ownership 
The Act answers the question "Can a university own patents?" However, going 
forward, the question remains "Should a university own patents?" The answer to this 
question should also be an unqualified "Yes." As previously noted, some 
commentators claim that university patenting creates, at least in part, the obstacles of 
funding and access that hamper academic research. 31 Professor Mark Lemley explains, 
"While in theory patents spur innovation, they can also interfere with it. Broad patents 
granted to initial inventors can lock up or retard improvements needed to take a new 
field from interesting lab results to commercial viability."32 Many of these initial, 
broad inventions are believed to result from the type of basic science and foundational 
research performed in the academy. Opponents of university patenting argue thus that 
research and innovation is hampered because patents can be used as blocking 
mechanisms, patents can create an anti commons effect, and patents can cause a chilling 
of the disclosure that is a tradition of the academy, all of which are perceived to inhibit 
access to research and increase the amount of funding required to do research. 
Patents, unlike most other forms of property rights, do not grant the holder any 
affirmative rights; rather, a patent simply permits the owner to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, or offering for sale the patented invention. 33 Because a patentee 
cannot technically grant a license to practice the invention, a patent license instead 
provides a promise from the patentee not to sue the licensee upon using the invention. 34 
This unusual bundle of rights granted by a patent can give rise to a situation where a 
later invention, which is patentable, cannot be practiced due to another, earlier issued 
patent.35 The earlier patent is a "blocking" patent, and its holder basically has 
exclusionary rights over not just the invention described in that patent, but also any 
other patent that requires that invention to be practiced.36 
For a very simplistic example, consider inventor A, who obtains a patent on a 
bucket. Inventor B invents a bucket with a handle. B 's invention is (for the purposes 
of this example, at least) patentable, because it is a new and non-obvious improvement 
on the prior art. However, to use B's invention, A's bucket is required; the patent on 
A is a blocking patent. B could choose to license the use of A's invention, or as is 
common in these situations, A and B could cross-license their patents to each other. 
However, A could potentially thwart B by refusing to license or cross-license its bucket 
patent. If there are other bucket patents out there, B might be able to negotiate with 
those patent owners, but if A's invention is, instead of a bucket, an essential research 
input or research tool for which there are no substitutes, this may not be an option. 
31. One additional criticism is the idea of"double paying." This complaint asserts that the public has 
funded the research through payment of taxes, but then also has to pay for the research again in the form 
of supra-competitive prices on the patented products that result. See Eisenberg, supra note 24. Regardless 
of the validity of this argument and its relevance generally to university patenting schemes, it is not related 
to the obstacles of access and funding, and thus is outside the scope of this paper. 
32. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 609,618-19 (2005). 
33. Pulsinelli, supra note 22, at 412-13. 
34. !d. at 413. 
35. !d. at 414. 
36. !d. 
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It is this ability to potentially block future innovation that fuels the first concern 
about university patenting. The foundational research performed by universities means 
that many inventions discovered may be necessary inputs or tools for further research. 
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, these inventions either became part of the public domain 
or were the property of the unlikely-to-litigate United States government, so the patents 
on these inventions did not pose a threat to future research. However, now that these 
patents on building block technologies are instead being held by private parties-
universities, research institutions, and an increasing number of companies-
commentators fear that one party may be able to block any or all future endeavors in 
a particular area of research through failure or refusal to license its patents. 
A related criticism is the idea that these patent rights will lead to a tragedy ofthe 
anticomrnons. Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg define the problem 
this way: 
[A] resource is prone to underuse in a "tragedy ofthe anticommons" when multiple 
owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an 
effective privilege of use. In theory, in a world of costless transactions, people could 
always avoid commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. In practice, 
however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs, strategic behaviors, 
and cognitive biases of participants, with success more likely within close-knit 
communities than among hostile strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting 
rights into usable private property is often brutal and slow. 37 
Proponents of the "tragedy of the anticomrnons" theory note that, although patents 
have been traditionally granted for downstream products, there is an increasing 
tendency for researchers, particularly in the biomedical area, to patent upstream 
inventions, such as research tools and inputs to basic research. 38 The argument is that 
patenting upstream technology will cause patent thickets that hinder future develop-
ment and research. 39 In particular, Heller and Eisenberg point to license stacking as 
leading to these problems because permission to use multiple upstream products and 
inputs will be necessary to conduct research.40 
For a simple hypothetical, consider a complicated research process that requires, 
among other things, two patented inputs and includes at least one patented step. Each 
of these three patents is owned by a separate party, and no single party has sufficient 
rights to perform the research process. The research process itself is not patented, and 
yet, to perform the process, a scientist will need to negotiate licenses with three parties, 
each with its own interests in mind. Although the inputs may only represent a small 
portion of the research process, the patentees of the inputs may require an industry-
37. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 698. 
38. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REv. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 318,330 (2006). 
39. /d. 
40. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 672. By way of example, many researchers conduct research 
leading to patents on segments of a gene sequence, which may prevent another researcher from collecting 
the pieces necessary to invent a screening method that needs to access multiple segments. See id. Stacking 
also creates issues with respect to funding because even if the above researcher can obtain licenses to access 
each of the necessary gene segments, the aggregation oflicensing fees may make the project financially 
untenable. See id. 
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standard royalty which is greater than the value of the input to the process.41 Thus, 
research becomes costly, both in terms of license fees that must be paid (and which 
may not reflect the value of the patented invention to the process) as well as the 
indirect costs of having to find and negotiate with multiple patent holders. 
Two additional criticisms, though less direct, blame patents for decreased 
research. First, at least one commentator contends that the process requirements of 
university patenting stifle the early disclosure and dialogue that have long been part of 
the university culture.42 Presentations and publications were previously the measure 
of productivity and prestige for academics.43 However, because disclosure of an 
invention via presentation or publication can destroy the novelty required to obtain a 
patent, university scientists are now being counseled to keep their research private until 
a patent application can be prepared.44 Because new inventions are not disclosed 
quickly, follow-on research is purportedly hindered. 
Second, some commentators assert that university patenting commercializes 
academia. 45 That is, professors are not conducting research for the sake of intellectual 
inquiry, but rather choose their projects based on commercial potential or investor 
guidance. 46 In addition to altering research paths away from basic science and towards 
applied science and commercial innovation, critics also contend that the increasing 
commercialization of university research labs is harming the university's attention to 
its other goal-education. "[M]odem [science and engineering] departments function 
more like miniature research corporations that happen to do some undergraduate 
teaching on the side."47 Because it is assumed that only universities will perform 
foundational research, critics argue that the fact scientists are steering away from this 
type of research will cause a dearth of innovation in basic research.48 
Without question, the bulk ofthe scholarship promotes the above argument that 
university patenting leads to lack of access, which in tum leads to decreased research 
and innovation. However, there is some limited support in the literature for university 
patenting.49 Professor F. Scott Kiefftakes on the anti-patent literature directly, arguing 
that "patents are essential" for the advancement of research and innovation. 5° KiefT 
contends, contrary to much of the literature, that patents may not be to blame for lack 
41. For a thorough and detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 324 
(2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=923468 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
42. Bagley, supra note 7, at 220-21. 
43. !d. at 239-40. 
44. !d. at 242-44. 
45. Strandburg, supra note 8. 
46. See id. 
47. Sarah J. Bannister, Note, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions: Science and 
Engineering Graduate Students Should Be Considered Employees Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 135 (2005) (citing JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNNERSITY, INC.: THE 
CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 73-1 02 (2005); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization 
of the University: Distance Learning at the Cost of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB.lNT. L.J. 73,100-13 
(2002)). 
48. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 8. 
49. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science-a Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 691 (2001). 
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of access because scientists have generally regarded their work as some form of 
intellectual property anyway and "have demonstrated countless ingenious methods for 
staking out, defending, and even pirating this form of intellectual property."51 KiefT 
goes on to note that, rather than blocking access, the exclusionary power granted by 
the patent is "paradoxically essential" to promoting utilization of the technology. 52 In 
addition to improving utilization, KiefT also argues that patent protection may also 
encourage research by providing a less-established scientist with necessary funding, 
whereas funds may otherwise only be available to more-established scientists.53 
Finally, KiefT argues that basic research, "like any process, can be viewed as one that 
requires inputs and generates outputs, and experience shows that patents on inputs 
generally do not prevent the production of outputs."54 
Although the literature in support of university patenting may be scarce, there are 
other indicators that this endeavor produces apparently positive results. For example, 
other industrial nations have begun implementing national legislation similar to the 
Bayh-Dole Act.55 For example, in 1998 Japan enacted a national "Industrial 
Revitalization Law" to allow university recipients of government funds to own the 
resulting intellectual property. 56 The Japanese law includes a provision for compulsory 
licensing if the universities are not working the invention and requires Japanese 
universities to license intellectual property rights free of charge "if the government 
believes it is in the public interest to do so."57 Similarly, Australia has a Bayh-Dole 
model of ownership for inventions resulting from government funding. 58 Some 
European countries have enacted legislation emulating many of the Bayh-Dole 
hallmarks. 59 Despite evidence of little success for these foreign technology transfer 
provisions,60 the significance is in these countries' belief that the provisions work in 
the United States and the appropriation of the idea for their own laws. 
51. !d. at 694 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 365 (1955)). 
52. !d. at 699. 
53. !d. at 703. 
54. !d. at 703-04 (citing Ellen Schrecker, Academic Freedom: The Historical View, in REGULATING 
THE INTELLECTUALS: PERSPECTIVES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOMS IN THE 1980s I (Craig Kaplan & Ellen 
Schrecker eds., 1983)). 
55. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 95 (Martin 
Kenney & Bruce Kogut, eds., 2004) (citing a recent report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) showing "a general trend across OECD countries to emulate the Bayh-Dole 
patent legislation .... "). 
56. See, e.g., Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 
44 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers. 
cfrn?abstract_id=917367 (all page references for this article refer to the version at this web address); The 
Brains Business, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory. 
cfm?story_id=4339960. 
57. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 68 (citation omitted). 
58. !d. at 69. 
59. !d. Despite any cultural differences, I contend that European technology transfer offices would 
likely experience more positive results if they expended effort to craft and execute a strategic patent 
management strategy. 
60. !d. 
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Neither KiefT nor the many critics of university patenting offer anything more than 
theoretical support for their respective positions. However, there is some reason to 
believe that the parade ofhorribles attributed to university patenting is unwarranted. 
In fact, a survey of current research, albeit preliminary, provides at least mixed support 
for the necessity of university patenting.61 Similar studies have been done to assess the 
effect of patenting on innovation outside of academia, but no study convincingly ties 
the presence of patenting to a decrease in research and innovation. To the contrary, 
studies have shown that the increased number of patents have in fact led to increased 
innovation. "[E]ven when employed for competitive purposes, patents appear to have 
also had the effect (perhaps ironically) of fostering innovation in new areas of 
research."62 Similarly, a study undertaken to determine whether the increase in patents 
was a result of patent-friendly courts or an actual increase in innovation came out 
decidedly in favor ofinnovation.63 Other scholars have tied the patent policy reforms 
of the 1980s, which made obtaining and enforcing patents easier, to a positive effect 
on technology commercialization. 64 Business is embracing patents and the result seems 
to be increased innovation. Given that patenting has been part of the academic 
landscape for some twenty-five years and part of the business landscape for much 
longer, and given that there has been no discernible slowdown in research and 
innovation in this country, it is a fair assumption that the effects of patenting at the 
university level are, if not beneficial, at least neutral. 
Thus, I argue that universities should own patents, leaving only the question of 
"What should a university do with its patents?" How this question is answered is the 
key to both allaying the above criticisms of university patenting, as well as, I believe, 
overcoming the prevailing obstacles to university research-funding and access. 
Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to address and among the barriers universities 
face as they enter the intellectual property arena. While the question of how a 
university should use its patents is likely a multi-level determination, the body that is 
likely to figure prominently in at least the implementation, if not the decision-making 
process, is the technology transfer office. 
C. University Technology Transfer Offices 
Not unlike the increase in popularity of patent attorneys and intellectual property 
counsel tied to the increased interest in intellectual property in the business world, the 
technology transfer office ofthe university has seen its popularity rise from overlooked 
(or even non-existent) to somewhat of a "big man on campus." Although the point for 
which Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss makes the following observation is negative, there 
is no denying the truth of the substance of the remark: "Universities have also begun 
to regard their technology transfer offices as the academic equivalent of their football 
teams: even if the offices aren't winning, there is cachet in fielding them. And the 
technology transfer offices want to win, just like the football teams do."65 
61. MOWERY, supra note 55, at 95. 
62. RNETTE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 45. 
63. Id. at 49. 
64. Jd. at 26. 
65. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental 
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Unfortunately, most technology transfer offices are not equipped or designed to win, 
in no small part because the characteristics of a well-functioning technology transfer 
office have not been well defined. Further, many universities have not considered how 
to fully integrate the technology transfer office with the university and the business 
world outside to achieve maximum benefit from the university's inventions and the 
protection efforts made by the technology transfer office. Any discussion of improving 
the intellectual property management strategy of a university must begin with the 
technology transfer office. 
One of the first requirements for a university to enter the patent arena is to 
establish a technology transfer office, an activity that has been on the increase. In 
1980, prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, there were only twenty-five 
technology transfer offices active at United States universities. 66 By 2005, that number 
had jumped to some 3,300 technology transfer offices active at universities, research 
institutions, and hospitals around the country.67 Over a similar time span, 1988-2003, 
patents assigned to universities rose from 800 patents to 3,200.68 The amount of 
money spent by universities on patent-acquisition increased from thirty-seven million 
dollars in 1991 to 221 million dollars in 2004.69 It is clear that it is not simply the 
researchers on campus that have been busy and productive-the technology transfer 
offices have been hard at work as well. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office, in conjunction with the NSF, 
prepared a report summarizing patents obtained by universities from 1969 to 2003, as 
well as information about research expenditures in 2002.70 In 2003, 3,259 utility 
patents were assigned to universities or colleges, out of a total of 169,024 utility 
patents granted overall.71 In that year, the leading universities, based on patents 
obtained, were the University of California (439 patents), the California Institute of 
Technology (139), Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology ( 127), and the University of 
Texas (96). 72 Not surprisingly, each of these universities has an active and visible 
technology transfer office presence. 73 
The second requirement is that the technology transfer office be arranged and 
equipped to adequately handle the necessary tasks to acquire and exploit intellectual 
property. This metric is a bit harder to measure, since there are numerous ways to 
Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457,464 (2004). 
66. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 43. 
67. Karen Pollarito, When Science Has a Potential Payoff, THE SCIENTIST, Jan. 17, 2005, available 
at http://www.the-scientist.com/article/display/15195. 
68. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2006, 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c5/c5h.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
69. AUTMsurvey, supra note 4, at 20. 
70. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT 
GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2003, http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/univ/univ _toc.htm (last visited Feb. 
16, 2007). 
71. /d. 
72. /d. 
73. See University of California Technology Transfer System, http://www.ucop.edu/ottl; Cal tech Office 
of Technology Transfer, http://www.ott.caltech.edu; MIT's Technology Licensing Office, 
http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/aboutlour_mission.html; University of Texas System Intellectual Property, 
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualproperty/index.htm. 
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establish a technology transfer office. For example, the technology transfer office of 
each of the institutions listed in the previous paragraph is arranged and equipped 
uniquely. 74 Typically, in the university setting, technology transfer offices will fall into 
four general modes: (i) a "centralized" model, where a single office provides patent 
acquisition services for all research and technology areas for the who~e university; (ii) 
a "decentralized" model, where the separate divisions ofthe technology transfer office 
are associated with different research and technology areas (for example, there may be 
one office or unit for the physics department, another for the engineering school, and 
so on); (iii) the "foundation" model, where an independent nonprofit organization is 
created expressly to manage intellectual property acquisition and/or licensing; and (iv) 
the "contractor" model, where a university outsources its acquisition and licensing 
activities to another entity, such as a law firm. 75 A technology transfer office may also 
utilize two or more of these modes in combination. 
At the least-involved end of the spectrum, the technology transfer office serves 
merely as a conduit between the researcher and an outside entity charged with 
obtaining and exploiting intellectual property on behalf of the university (following the 
contractor model). 76 For example, the technology transfer office may gather invention 
disclosures from scientists on campus and forward them to an outside law firm hired 
by the university. At the other end of the spectrum, the technology transfer office may 
also pursue acquisition and exploitation of inventions from within; this could be done 
either on a centralized or decentralized basis. 77 For example, a well-staffed technology 
transfer office may be able to gather invention disclosures, apply for and prosecute 
patents, and actively seek to license or otherwise exploit the resulting intellectual 
property assets. Most technology transfer offices will fall somewhere in between the 
two extremes. 
In addition to acquiring and exploiting intellectual property in a traditional 
manner, universities have also begun to address the research-funding question 
creatively by implementing industrial affiliate programs.78 In these affiliations, for 
example, an industry partner will pay an annual fee in the ten thousand to fifty 
thousand dollar range in exchange for having first rights in the intellectual property 
generated in a certain sector or sectors of the university's research developments. 
Harvard, a leader in this type of partnership arrangement, announced in November 
2005 its intent to seek more commercial partnerships for research and licensing, and 
plans to spend ten million dollars on an "accelerator fund" to bridge the gap between 
early stage research funded by private agencies and advanced research paid for by 
74. For example, the Intellectual Property division of the General Counsel's office for the University 
of Texas system staff includes two attorneys, one legal assistant, and one support person. See 
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectuaiProperty/index.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). In contrast, 
MIT's website boasts twenty-nine employees, including four technology licensing officers/directors (one 
designated an attorney), five additional technology licensing officers, four associate technology licensing 
officers, two technology licensing associates (one designated an attorney), four financial operations staff, 
four office operations staff, two persons for patent administration, two legal assistants and two 
administrative assistants. See http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/about/our _staff.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
75. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 44. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. 
78. /d. at 45. 
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venture capitalists.79 Technology transfer offices stand to play an integral liaison role 
in these relationships as well. 
Unfortunately, the reality is that technology transfer offices are often not arranged 
or equipped to fulfill these varying roles in the patent acquisition and exploitation 
arenas. From the exponential increase in amount of university inventions being 
considered for patenting, to the wide array of potential subject areas of invention at 
large universities, to the difficulty in determining industry partners or potential 
licensees without being part ofthe industry, to convincing administrators and scientists 
that the academic culture now includes patents and that priorities and resources should 
be allocated appropriately, the technology transfer offices of today and the future have 
many difficult tasks. These tasks are made more difficult by the fact that most 
universities do not yet view themselves as commercial players in the intellectual 
property arena, and even some ofthe more forward-thinking institutions are not sure 
how to do it well. Universities, and in particular the technology transfer offices, need 
to look no further than the business world to gain all of the information and insight 
needed to play the game well. 
III. WHAT Do BUSINESSES KNOW THAT UNIVERSITIES DON'T? 
Businesses did not spring into the intellectual property arena fully formed and 
ready to acquire and exploit patent assets. Rather, the adoption and implementation 
of patent management strategies required a number of small steps, forward and 
backward, before becoming generally accepted and adopted by most firms. Although 
slow to embrace at first, businesses now fully accept that "(t]he old industrial era has 
been supplanted by a new knowledge-based economy in which ideas and innovation 
rather than land or natural resources have become the principal wellsprings of 
economic growth and competitive business advantage."80 The simplest expression of 
this notion is quite clear: "[I]deas really are where the money is. "81 This is the first 
point that universities need to embrace in order to learn from the experience of 
business in intellectual property. Oddly, universities, which have always been in the 
business of ideas and innovation, seem more hesitant to adopt these maxims than did 
the business world. 
Businesses exhibit a number of different motivations driving the adoption of 
intellectual property management schemes, motivations that may not have influenced 
the academy-yet. Overcoming the initial reluctance to engage in patent acquisition 
and exploitation was not always easy; some companies, including Microsoft and Dell, 
did not become patent owners until they found themselves on the defensive ends of 
patent litigation suits. 82 Other companies entered the patent game after witnessing the 
success (and their relative Jack in comparison) of their competitors who had embraced 
intellectual property.83 Regardless of what spurred their entry into the patent arena, 
more and more companies are becoming more and more active in their acquisition of 
79. Stephen Heuser, Harvard Woos Firms to Fund Research, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2005 at I. 
80. RIVETTE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 1-2. 
81. /d. at 50. 
82. Id. at 45-46. 
83. /d. 
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intellectual property. For example, some large companies, such as Sun and Oracle, 
have boosted the size of their patent portfolios by more than 500 percent in just a few 
years.84 
In addition to exhibiting a growing interest in obtaining patents, businesses are 
making increased efforts to exploit their acquired intellectual property assets. Patent 
licensing revenues rose some 700 percent, from $15 billion in 1990 to $100 billion in 
1998.85 These revenues can be used in a number of ways: to boost company earnings 
and shareholder returns, to improve the return on research and development 
investments, or to seed additional research and innovation. Beyond simple revenue 
generation, firms may also utilize their intellectual property assets to generate non-
monetary benefits. For example, value associated with patents can be used to raise 
corporate valuations, enhance equity, and serve as a type of currency for mergers and 
acquisitions.86 Patents may further be used as an offensive business tool, encouraging 
competitors to not engage in certain behaviors, or as a defensive business tool, 
providing the business with an asset to offer for cross-license if accused of violating 
another's intellectual property rights. Finally, patents often serve a signaling function, 
supplying information about the technological and legal competence of a business.87 
Depending on the technology involved, innovation level, and breadth of the patent, a 
business can use a patent for any, or all, of these purposes, all of which provide visible 
benefits to the business. 
On the flipside, a mismanaged patent portfolio can produce devastating results for 
the company. Failure to have a coherent patent management strategy can lead to 
breakdowns in both the acquisition and exploitation of a business's intellectual 
property assets. These breakdowns can include: failure to obtain critical patents or 
patents that may lead to lucrative situations; failure to identify potential relationships 
with partners and licensees; failure to realize the defensive value of a patent portfolio 
when challenged by another company on intellectual property issues; and failure to 
follow through on patent-related aspects of business, such as product development, 
branding, and market expenditures. 88 Although businesses seem to have embraced 
intellectual property, there are, of course, still problems. In contrast to universities, 
where the primary problem appears to be the lack of an intellectual property 
management strategy, or worse, the failure to acknowledge the importance of pursuing 
intellectual property assets, businesses more often stumble in their execution of 
already-established strategic plans. In a 1998 survey of companies, 90 percent of 
companies agreed that patents can be important, but 71 percent admitted to wasting 
research and development resources through patent mismanagement. 89 Similarly, while 
84 percent of these companies have a patent policy in place, only 42 percent conduct 
regular IP audits to ensure that their patent policy is achieving its goals.90 
84. !d. at 4. 
85. !d. at 5. 
86. !d. at 29. 
87. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 627-28 (2002). 
88. RIVETIE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 99, I 0 I. 
89. !d. at 102. 
90. !d. 
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To play successfully in the intellectual property arena, the first step for any 
business is to develop a coherent patent strategy. For most businesses, this strategy 
will be aimed at three primary objectives: 1) strengthening its proprietary market 
advantages, 2) improving financial performance, and 3) enhancing competitiveness.91 
To strengthen its proprietary market advantages, a business will want to maintain the 
technology edge of its products or services, focus on boosting the outputs of its 
research and development efforts, exercise effective branding of its products, and 
anticipate and move early with respect to market and technology shifts.92 Improving 
financial performance will require the business to audit and examine its patent assets 
for new revenue sources, reduce its costs, and bolster its corporate financing and 
valuation efforts.93 Finally, to enhance competitiveness, the business will want to 
analyze and outflank its competitors, identify and exploit new market opportunities, 
and reduce competitive risks.94 
These goals should not be surprising--every firm wants to make more money and 
outdo its competitors. Rembrandts asserts successful achievement of these goals can 
be obtained through the intelligent use of patent assets. 95 In particular, the book 
provides an assessment system to be applied to a business's intellectual property-the 
"Grow-Fix-Sell" triage to assist with patent exploitation.96 A business cannot exploit 
its intellectual property until it knows what assets it holds and where those assets can 
be used.97 To make these assessments, the business must first audit its intellectual 
property assets, assign the patents to a responsible business unit, and create a grid map 
in which business units are grouped with respect to growth and potential.98 Once the 
intellectual property assets are identified and assigned to a responsible unit, each asset 
is analyzed to determine if it should be grown, fixed or sold.99 An asset that should be 
grown is one that has potential to develop into new product lines or expand into new 
markets. 100 An asset slated for fixing may be in an area of slow growth or cluttered or 
eroding markets; the business may need to assess whether there are ways the asset can 
still be used beneficially. 101 Finally, an asset that cannot be used for growing or fixing 
should be sold to get the most economic or strategic value from the asset that offers no 
additional value to the business. 102 
In addition to assessing the business's existing assets for potential exploitation, the 
business must have a strategy for patent acquisition. When determining what techno-
logies to pursue patent protection for, a firm must identify the business's core techno-
logy advantage and seek patents to reinforce the product's differentiating features and 
91. !d. at64-65. 
92. !d. at 64. 
93. !d. at 65. 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 68. 
96. !d. at 66-68. 
97. !d. 
98. !d. at 67. 
99. !d. 
I 00. !d. at 70. 
101. !d. at 77. 
102. !d. at 81. 
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control the choke points in the manufacturing and distributing lines. 103 This may 
involve patenting key methods for building, marketing, and selling the product, beyond 
seeking protection for the product itself. 104 In identifying what to protect, the business 
should conduct a preliminary assessment to identify exactly what its core technology 
advantage is, that is, the business must identify the nature of its product or products 
and how it fits within the business's strategic goals. 105 Next, the business must 
determine the feasibility of exploiting the technology, which may require analyzing the 
costs involved, the technology required to manufacture and distribute, and the time it 
will take to get a viable product to market. 106 With these steps in place, the business 
should be able to appropriately identify technology for patenting, as well as have a 
strategy for managing the patents it has obtained. 
However, simply designing a patent management strategy is not sufficient-the 
business needs to implement and execute the strategy as well. 107 As noted above, it is 
more often at this step that businesses fail. 108 The first issue with respect to execution 
is to ensure that management is structured to reflect the importance of intellectual 
property. 109 This will often require a change in leadership structure; at a minimum the 
intellectual property decision-making cannot be the sole province of the in-house 
patent counsel. 110 Instead, Rembrandts recommends a multi-level structure to 
implement the intellectual property strategy, ranging from business units to high-level 
executives. 111 The business units, with front-line experience, are responsible for 
reporting patent creation and usage. 112 However, the responsibility for overseeing the 
execution of the intellectual property strategy must rise above the business units and 
be centralized to the business. 113 Finally, ultimate leadership decisions must be made 
at an upper level, such as senior vice president. 114 Part of the purpose for this 
delegation of duties is to allocate responsibility to the parties best able to accomplish 
the task. 115 In other words, the business units will be most knowledgeable about the 
product's core and differentiating features as well as the choke points for 
manufacturing and distribution. 116 Alternatively, a higher-level officer will understand 
a product's fit within the entire business line and will also have the power to implement 
the decisions. 117 
This interplay between the various levels in the patent management structure 
would be incomplete without mention of the inventors. In fact, the perceived divide 
103. /d. at 106-07. 
104. /d. at 107. 
105. /d. at 113. 
106. !d. at 116. 
107. !d. at 116-18. 
108. /d. at 102. 
I 09. /d. at 85. 
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between the research side and the management side of business is perhaps one ofthe 
reasons for the hesitancy of business to adopt intellectual property as a commodity. 
As authors Julie L. Davis and Suzanne S. Harrison note: 
In many companies, the research and development or 'R&D' function, has been 
literally a 'black box.' Inventors-whether engineers, scientists, or web designers-
have received special treatment--often keeping odd hours and receiving incentives 
for their ideas .... It has been up to the business folks on the other side of the 
wall--or even in a different building altogether-to shape and refine that idea into a 
saleable product or service that can generate revenue. 118 
Any effective patent management strategy will need to bridge this gap between science 
and business. 
Businesses are embracing these strategies and techniques, and they are benefiting 
from the strategic acquisition and exploitation of their intellectual property. A number 
of simple, but important thoughts should be clear from this brief synopsis of 
Rembrandts. First, patents are critical. Second, patents need to be acquired on a 
relatively generous, although strategic, basis. That is, a business should acquire patents 
on more than just its invented technology, but also the technology associated with the 
manufacturing and distribution and any other choke point in the process. Third, 
patents can be used by businesses in a variety of different manners; the business needs 
to consider ways to use their patents creatively. Fourth, businesses that acquire patents 
cannot just rest on their laurels, but instead need to regularly and actively review their 
patent portfolios looking for opportunities to grow, fix, or sell. Fifth, the structure of 
the parties responsible for executing the business's intellectual property management 
strategy is important to ensure success. 
Although universities suffer from some unique problems in that they are not 
simply businesses, these essential points can be applied and adapted to not just address 
the peculiarities of academia, but also to overcome the barriers that universities 
typically cite as reasons against implementing patent management strategies and to 
alleviate the obstacles that hamper university research. 
IV. How CAN UNIVERSITIES BE MORE LIKE BUSINESSES? 
Universities, like businesses, are experiencing a period where intellectual property 
is becoming an increasingly critical commodity. It is not only in the business world 
that intellectual property assets are the new cash, and similar to businesses, the indirect 
benefits for a university of acquiring and exploiting intellectual property assets are 
many. The problem is that universities most often do not view their intellectual 
property management activities as an integral part of their "business." They have not 
set up a coherent patent management strategy. They may not have even set up a 
technology transfer office, although this is becoming rarer. However, of the 
universities that have set up technology transfer offices, most were not created with the 
execution of a patent management strategy in mind. In this section, I will review the 
problems with universities in moving in this direction, as well as analyze a proposal 
118. JULIEL. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING COMPANIES 
REALIZE VALUE FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS I (200 I). 
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that has been raised to address some of the problems. I then provide the university 
with a primer for creating an intellectual property management strategy and a proposed 
structure to help it effectively implement the designed strategy. 
A. The Problems with Universities 
In order to function like a business, the university will need to have an overall 
intellectual property management strategy, at least a basic understanding of the bows 
and whys of exploiting its intellectual property, and the infrastructure to implement 
these plans. Unfortunately, universities are lacking to some extent each of these three 
facets. 
One problem with establishing a patent management strategy at the university level 
may be the academy's historical aversion or disinterest in the patent system. However, 
even if a university surmounts this hurdle and enters the patent arena, it likely faces one 
or more of the following, additional difficulties. First, the breadth of research at 
universities prohibits the ability to base a strategic plan along a set of product lines. 
For example, in the business arena, a car manufacturer will be seeking patents on 
automobile technology, plus the manufacturing and distribution technologies to bring 
the automobile technology to the public. Even research that results in technology 
outside of conventional automobile technology is likely to be driven by or relate to the 
core research; one such technology might be a database designed as a knowledge-
management system for tracking best-practices on the assembly line. While a 
knowledge-management database is not likely to be considered conventional 
automobile technology, it was driven by the underlying goal of developing automobile 
technology. A strategic plan can be built around these technologies, because they 
derive from foreseeable sources. 
A university, on the other hand, has research occurring in multiple areas, on 
multiple levels, which may be wholly unrelated to other research in other areas. The 
biomedical engineering department may be inventing new materials for creating 
implants that generate fewer rejection reactions from a patient's body, while the 
medical school may be inventing new surgical procedures and the tools to perform 
them, and the physics department may be developing new methods and apparatuses for 
smashing atoms to generate energy. The inventions and directions of research are not 
coherent, and (again, largely unlike businesses) the directions may change from year 
to year. This breadth of invention may create a great difficulty for a patent 
management team to decide where to focus limited energies and efforts-it is hard to 
create a strategy for patent acquisition when it is unknown from where the next 
invention may be corning. 
Second, universities, who are hampered perhaps by their late entry into this arena, 
are unaware ofthe bows and whys of exploiting their patents. Many institutions now 
understand that at least one common exploitation technique is licensing, but the 
mechanics of doing so escape them. Intellectual property licensing in academia has 
been skyrocketing; one study estimates licensing at some $611 million in 1997 (an 89 
percent increase over 1993). 119 Despite these encouraging statistics, it is fair to say that 
119. RrvETIE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 12-13 (but still acknowledging that there is conflict between 
academic freedom and the desire to profit). 
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universities are not making their best efforts at licensing their assets. In general, 
universities are passive in their licensing attempts, limiting their efforts to cold calling, 
listing available technology on the Internet, or attempting to foster industry contacts 
by hiring technology transfer office staffhaving business backgrounds. 12° Cold calling 
and technology listings are not generally successful modalities because there are 
information deficiencies-technology transfer offices may not know who to pursue as 
potential licensees and companies seeking licenses may not think of universities as the 
place to look to license technology. Moreover, as noted previously, the breadth of 
inventions and research areas at the university make it nearly impossible for the 
technology transfer office to be knowledgeable in each, a prerequisite to understanding 
the pool of potential licensees. Further, university technology transfer offices have 
been accused of over-charging potential licensees to the point of deterring deals, 
perhaps because of a lack of understanding of the market in which the licensing occurs 
or the strategic plan of the university with respect to this technology. 121 On the flip-
side, university technology transfer offices have also been charged with pipelining 
exclusive deals to favored licensees, such as faculty start-up businesses, for little or no 
consideration, agreements that entice faculty members to work and remain at the 
institution, but may not be the most lucrative use of the asset. 122 
Another issue hampering licensing by the university is its desire to "have its cake 
and eat it too." That is, institutions are writing into their license agreements terms 
which they would object to ifthey were on the other end of the deal. 123 One National 
Institute of Health study 
concluded that "universities have sought just about every kind of clause in research 
tool licenses to which they themselves have objected, including publication 
restrictions, rights in or the option to license future discoveries, and prohibition on 
transfer to other institutions or scientists." This phenomenon has been characterized 
as the "Paradox of the Patent Community" whereby universities, as major-technology 
users, appear to have an interest in broad-use rights, but as major patent-owners they 
fight instead for stronger patent protections.124 
One final impediment to university exploitation of their patent assets are the 
reports that very few universities are profiting from their technology transfer 
enterprises. 125 Patent royalties appear insignificant when compared to total university 
revenue, constituting somewhere between 0.5 and 2 percent of revenue at the high 
end. 126 Not surprisingly, the biggest success stories seem to be in the pharmaceutical 
world, where the risks and payouts are the biggest for all players. One such example 
120. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 45. 
121. /d. at 48 (citing Pollarito, supra note 67, at 6). 
122. /d. 
123. /d. at 52. 
124. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 52 (quoting NIH Report on Working Group on Research Tools 
(1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools). 
125. Heuser, supra note 79, at 2. 
126. Amy Kapczynski eta!., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I 031, I 088 (2005) (citing Yochai Benkler, Commons-
Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE Ill 0 (2004)). 
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is the patented HIV drug Emtriva, developed in part by Emory University. 127 Another 
is the Cohen-Boyer patent on recombinant DNA technology licensed successfully by 
Stanford University. 128 
However, putting aside the superstars of university licensing, the low revenue 
percentage associated with licensing may be quite misleading-revenue for universities 
comes from a number of different sources, from tuition to gifts to athletic ticket sales 
to licensing of branded products. It is not surprising, given the nature of the patents 
as well as the ineptitude that many technology transfer offices exhibit with respect to 
licensing, that the licensing income stream is not substantial. Furthermore, universities 
are not viewing these figures with the proper attitude; these figures represent nearly 
pure profit. The research has been done and was going to be done anyway, and the 
costs of obtaining intellectual property protection are a minor expenditure compared 
to the costs of research. Thus, if the technology can be licensed at all, it should 
represent a win-win situation for the university. 
Therefore, an important part of the university's patent management strategy must 
include a more robust and active approach to licensing, as well as making efforts to use 
intellectual property assets in alternative ways. To do this, the intellectual property 
management team must be aware of potential licensees, understand current business 
and technology trends, and recognize, to the extent possible, how the current university 
research fits into the big picture. This leads to the third problem, which is that a 
university often lacks adequate infrastructure to exploit its intellectual property assets 
in the same way a business does. Technology transfer offices, the department typically 
held at least partially responsible for acquiring and exploiting patents, vary greatly in 
their staffing. Some universities staff their technology transfer offices with attorneys, 
others with business majors or administrators. Regardless of whether the office is 
staffed with lawyers or business people, given the breadth of inventions coming out of 
the university's research labs, it is unlikely that the staff will be sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the best avenues for licensing in many cases. Further, the 
technology transfer office is not often a high-level department in the university, so 
decision-making will often need to go above. Without a strategic plan, the knowledge 
to exploit the assets, and the infrastructure to do so, it is unlikely that the assets 
acquired by the university are going to reach their full potential and are much more 
likely to cause the problems attributed to them, as discussed previously. 
This observation that universities are not effectively utilizing their intellectual 
property is not new. Professor Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, for one, has noted this 
problem (and other problems that plague university patenting) and proposes a unified 
national techno logy transfer center to make identifYing potential licensing relationships 
more convenient. 129 This center would be organized by technology departments, using 
the Patent Office technology center taxonomy for example. 130 The center would 
127. Bagley, supra note 7, at n.47. 
128. Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote 
Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477,485 (2005). 
129. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 74. Ritchie de Larena also views underreporting of patented 
inventions prepared with federal funding to be a significant problem, to which her proposal is also 
addressed. 
130. !d. at 74. 
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provide a primary, centralized repository of university patents for businesses seeking 
to license technology. 131 Income received from the licensing would be split; the 
revenue from the license to a commercial licensee would be used first to pay for the 
costs associated with patenting the technology. 132 Second, a small fee may be charged 
to cover the operating costs of the center. 133 Of the remaining revenue, the inventors 
would share a substantial portion. 134 Some small percentage would go to the institution 
to which the inventor belongs and a nominal amount would go to the university to 
cover the technology transfer office overhead costs. 135 Finally, the remaining amount 
(approximately one-third of the revenue) would be returned to the university for use 
in further research. 136 Ritchie de Larena's proposal envisions that the center would 
work directly with researchers to obtain protection for new inventions. 137 The center 
would also have a Board of Advisors, consisting of university, government, legal, and 
industry experts, to make suggestions for commercializing the inventions. 138 The 
center would also maintain a public Internet database of all university patents and their 
licensing status. 139 
Although Ritchie de Larena's proposal is very appealing, it is not specifically 
directed towards overcoming three barriers to successful exploitation of patents by the 
university. First, it does not suggest an intellectual property management strategy. 
Second, it does not provide the university with the bows and whys of patent acquisition 
and exploitation. Third, it does not provide the vital infrastructure necessary to create 
an effective technology transfer office, even though it does provide a structure to assist 
with developing relationships between businesses and universities for licensing 
purposes. To address these particular concerns, I propose both a primer and a structure 
that adapt and promote the strategies and behaviors set forth in Rembrandts, leading 
to effective acquisition and exploitation of inventions, and in turn, reduced obstacles 
to research. 
B. A Patent Acquisition and Exploitation Primer for Universities 
There are three main points a university will need to address to establish and 
implement a successful intellectual property management strategy which, as will be 
explained below, should promote research and innovation by alleviating the funding 
and access obstacles. First, a university needs to embrace patenting and seek patents 
generously. Second, a university needs to create a patent management strategy that 
reflects the objectives of the institution. Third, a university needs to implement an 
infrastructure that permits the execution of the established strategy, a topic covered in 
Part C below. 
13 I. !d. 
132. !d. at 75. 
133. Id. 
134. !d. 
135. /d.at76. 
136. !d. 
137. !d. at 77-78. 
138. !d. at 78. 
139. !d. 
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I. Embrace Patenting 
A university needs to allocate resources to enable the institution to embrace and 
generously seek patents, and further to educate its scientists about the patenting process 
(with the hopes of encouraging the acceptance of patenting on the research side of the 
academy). At the next level, the university's technology transfer office will need to 
analyze inventions to determine how they fit within the .university's overall patenting 
scheme to generously, but intelligently, seek patent protection. The concern about 
allocating resources is understandable; with dwindling state budgets and wildly 
expanding college tuition costs, universities are particularly sensitive about spending 
money on an endeavor that is not directly related to education or research. One way 
to manage this is to try to make the technology transfer office somewhat self-funding, 
that is, revenue from licensing may support the operations of the technology transfer 
office, including the costs of acquiring patents, overhead, and personnel. (This also 
provides a side benefit ofincentivizing the technology transfer office to actively, not 
passively, license the university's patent assets in order to generate sufficient funds for 
its support.) 
To further encourage the university's embracing of patenting, the technology 
transfer office will need to address the current divide between the scientists and the 
business side of intellectual property. On a pragmatic level, researchers need to 
understand the importance of submitting their research to the technology transfer office 
at an early stage; they also need to be aware of how their presentation and publication 
activities may affect the patentability of inventions. On a socio-cultural level, the 
issues may be addressed head-on, with the eventual hopes of convincing researchers 
to embrace patenting, by creating a team atmosphere between the technology transfer 
office and the researchers and by educating the researchers about the benefits of 
patents. 
The task of analyzing inventions to fit within the university's patent management 
strategy, and to generously but strategically seek patent protection, is much more 
difficult. As discussed previously, in a business, most of the inventions will either be 
the core technology of the company or will be related to or driven by this core 
technology. For this reason, the intellectual property department of a business will be 
able to readily identify how a new invention fits within the general strategy and scheme 
for the company. In the university setting this is not the case because inventions can 
come from a myriad of technology areas and there is no general sense of staying within 
a singular type of inventions. Moreover, the trajectory of research, even within a 
discrete department in the university, may change over time, depending on the faculty 
makeup, the outside funding available, and the popular trends of research. Thus, part 
of the intellectual property strategy for a university technology transfer office is to not 
just embrace patenting, but to create some sort of strategy for determining which 
inventions to acquire patent rights for and on which patents to actively pursue 
licensees. 
2. Patent Management Strategy 
Next, the university needs to create a patent management strategy that reflects its 
objectives. In business, the primary objectives are most often to 1) strengthen 
proprietary market advantage; 2) improve financial performance; and 3) enhance 
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competitiveness. 140 Translating these objectives to the university setting does not 
require much alteration. In fact, university administrators are unlikely to complain 
about achieving any or all of these objectives. To be precise, however, a university's 
objectives must include university specific issues. Improving financial performance 
can take on many faces at the university. Financial performance can be boosted 
directly by funneling revenue into the school in the form of licensing fees, or similarly, 
by attracting more students and their tuition dollars. Indirectly, financial performance 
can be improved by decreasing the outlays required by the university, such as by 
attracting grants to fund research (so the university then does not need to fund as many 
projects). In a related vein, the university also wants to enhance competitiveness, 
which in the currency of universities includes prestige, which again lures more and 
better students, faculty, and funding. The first objective, strengthening a proprietary 
market advantage, does not have a precise analog with respect to the university. One 
way to think about this may be as strengthening the university's research advantages. 
This can include increasing grant and licensing revenue, permitting and promoting a 
wide variety of research, and attracting top talent in both the faculty and student ranks. 
The question then becomes how the university can exploit its intellectual property 
assets to achieve these defined objectives. The grow-fix-sell triage proposed by 
Rembrandts can be easily adapted for use in a university setting. 141 At the outset, the 
university must audit (both initially and at regular intervals) its patent portfolio and 
determine what inventions and what technology sectors are suited for seeking potential 
licensees. This is difficult, to be sure, since the inventions will be from diverse sectors 
of technology with little rhyme or reason and no single product line to tie advances to. 
It will also be difficult because university technology transfer offices are unlikely to 
have sufficient skill or knowledge in each and every area in which inventions are being 
submitted. If this hurdle can be surmounted, using the proposal below for altering the 
makeup of the technology transfer office, the technology transfer office can then apply 
the grow-fix-sell triage system, again with some modifications. 
In the business setting, patents tagged for growth have been identified as being 
primed for development into new product lines or expansion into new markets. 142 
These activities do not have a direct correlation in the university setting for two 
reasons. First, universities are frequently developing new inventions or product lines 
in a vast array of scientific areas, and so developing a new product line or expanding 
into new markets is not a terribly useful metric. Second, one of the major complaints 
against university patenting is the notion that it brings a level of commercialization that 
interferes with academic freedom. 143 To then target research to specifically develop 
a new product line would exacerbate this problem. At least initially in the university 
setting, the real growth should be increasing patent acquisition and encouraging 
relationships with potential licensees. The university should also focus on using its 
intellectual property assets to grow its academic capital and further its goals of 
education and research. However, as the sophistication level ofthe technology transfer 
140. RIVETIE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 64-65. 
141. !d. at 124-36. 
142. /d.at68-77. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48. 
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office increases, it can endeavor to focus more like a business and seek new product 
lines or markets for its inventions. The sticking point is that the technology transfer 
office will unlikely be in the position to have the requisite information. The structure 
proposed below addresses this issue. 
In the business setting, patents are identified in the fix category if they fall within 
areas of slowing growth or in cluttered or eroding markets. 144 The business will need 
to see if the intended use for this patent can be "fixed"--can the patent somehow be 
relevant in the slower market? Because universities will likely be only in the licensing 
market (as opposed to making or manufacturing a product themselves), the fix category 
is not so relevant. However, to give this category relevance in the university setting, 
the fix category can be composed of patents for which licensing efforts have been 
made, but failed, and where these patents are viewed as having future licensing or other 
potential. Rather than simply releasing the invention to the public domain or otherwise 
failing to exploit the patent, the technology transfer office faced with this situation 
needs to think outside the box in search of other uses or applications for the 
technology, at least until the future licensing opportunities become a reality. 
In the business setting, the sell patents are fairly self-explanatory. These are the 
patents that are no longer useful and have no perceivable value going forward. 145 The 
point is then simply to get the most economic or strategic value from the sale of the 
dying business. 146 Universities do not often (and in fact are usually bound not to) sell 
their intellectual property assets and must rely on licensing. 147 However, the 
identification of these patents in the sell category may indicate which patents need to 
be pruned from the active licensing set or which patents need not be maintained (as a 
maintenance fee is required at regular intervals to keep a patent in force). The 
difference between the fix patents, which have no licensees, and sell patents, which 
also have no licensees, is that the fix patents have some perceivable future value at the 
time of assessment. Looking at these sell patents, there is no ascertainable future use, 
no outside-the-box functions that render keeping the patent relevant. These patents 
should be sold or no longer maintained by the university. 
In summary, in the grow mode, the technology transfer office needs to be 
concerned with connecting what is being done in the university with what is being done 
in industry. In fix mode, the technology transfer office needs to be concerned with the 
immediate issue of determining whether each particular patent asset has visible or 
imaginable value. If not, then the technology is demoted to the sell category. The 
biggest problem is that most, if not all, university technology transfer offices are not 
equipped to understand and analyze the trends ofbusiness and technology. 148 The next 
section provides a proposal to improve the technology transfer office's capability to 
handle these tasks. 
144. !d. at 77. 
145. !d. at 81. 
146. Id. at 133-36. 
147. In particular, the Bayh-Dole Act only authorizes, and in fact encourages, licensing. 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200, 202, 204 (2007). See also, Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the 
Benefits ofState-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California's Stem 
Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1197 (2006). 
148. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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C. A Proposed Infrastructure and Structure 
Ultimately, the key to implementing and executing the previously described patent 
management strategy is equipping the technology transfer office with the tools it needs 
to succeed. Part of this solution must come from within the office itself; it must be 
appropriately staffed to perform the required functions. However, because of the 
unique situation of the university and its diverse range of inventions, it is not feasible 
(or perhaps not even possible) for the technology transfer office to be responsible for 
all of the required knowledge. For example, to identify potential licensees or to 
determine whether a patent has an imaginable future value, a technology transfer office 
will need to be knowledgeable about the trends for research and commercialization in 
the field of an invention; however, with the myriad variety of inventions springing from 
university research, a technology transfer office simply cannot reasonably be charged 
with detailed knowledge of each sector. Thus, I suggest changes in the structure of the 
technology transfer office and further propose a new structure, outside the university, 
to facilitate the technology transfer office in implementing the above detailed patent 
management strategy. 
Currently, most technology transfer offices are staffed by a few attorneys or 
possibly a few business people. 149 A few technology transfer offices are lucky enough 
to have some scientific expertise on staff. 150 The most fortunate offices may have a few 
of each of these types of employees. No matter what the combination of employees, 
it is nearly impossible for the technology transfer office to have sufficient 
understanding in each of the various research areas in which patents are being obtained 
to perform the necessary analytic tasks. Although the proposed structure described 
below-the University Patent Resource Center (UPRC)-goes a long way to solving 
this problem, the composition of the technology transfer office staff must be a primary 
consideration. I propose three main policies for staffing a technology transfer office 
to ensure that it is capable of performing the tasks described above: 1) each office 
must include at least one patent attorney on staff; 2) each office must include some 
significant portion of the staff that has scientific knowledge; and 3) each office must 
have at least one business person on staff. 
First, there must be at least a patent attorney on the staff of the technology transfer 
office. Depending on the volume of inventions generated by the university and the 
number of attorneys employed by the technology transfer office, the lawyer can draft 
and prosecute patent applications at the Patent Office or can supervise the same 
activities performed by external law firms or law student interns (or some combination 
of the three). The attorney should also be responsible for at least reviewing, if not 
drafting, the patent licensing agreements. Finally, but certainly not least, the attorney 
must oversee the education of scientists at the university about important patent-related 
issues, such as submitting inventions disclosures, maintaining and corroborating 
149. Of course, any smoothly functioning administrative office will have a sufficient number of support 
staff, such as secretaries or paralegals. I in no way diminish the importance of these types of employees 
by their omission; rather, I am trying to make a point with respect to the "professional" staffing of 
technology transfer offices. 
150. See supra note 74. 
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research notebooks, and avoiding patent-barring activities related to presentations and 
publications. 
Second, the technology transfer office must include a significant number of staff 
members with scientific knowledge. For this aspect, I propose using graduate students 
in a variety of specializations to serve semester or year-long terms as assistants to the 
technology transfer office, rather than as teaching assistants for that time period. lSI 
These graduate students will be better able to understand the science presented in the 
inventions and have some idea, based on their own knowledge and available reports 
on industry trends, how each invention might be utilized in industry and how the 
invention fits within the university's growing patent portfolio. The reason that 
graduate students are proposed to fill this task is manifold. First, these students are 
likely to be up to date in their knowledge of the cutting edge directions in their field. 
Second, by virtue of being scientists, the graduate assistants will have an ability to 
understand scientific inventions not immediately within their research areas, at least 
at a basic level. Third, these students, working as graduate assistants, can provide 
valuable work for reasonable compensation. Further, because the graduate students' 
salaries will be low, the technology transfer office will be able to employ a larger 
number of these students, thereby representing a greater number of technology areas 
present within the university. Finally, the exposure that the graduate assistants have 
to the technology transfer process early in their careers may indoctrinate them into the 
new academic mindset, where patenting is done as a matter of course, thereby changing 
the culture and relationships between science and patents. 
Third, there needs to be at least one business person on staff at the technology 
transfer office. This person needs to understand typical industry analyses and reports, 
serve as a liaison and negotiator between the university and industry (and possibly 
between the technology transfer office and the university administration), and assist in 
developing strategic plans for intellectual property acquisition and exploitation. 
Moreover, this person, along with the attorneys and graduate assistants, will need to 
think outside the box with respect to the patents designated for growth or fixing. 
Because the business person will not need to be intimately familiar with the details of 
the science, this person will have a better view of the overall picture and can provide 
an industry level insight that may not be available from the scientists or attorneys. 
Populating the university technology transfer office with persons having the skills 
necessary to enable the office to perform tasks indicated in the patent management 
strategy proposed above goes a long way toward fixing many of the barriers associated 
with entering the patent arena; nevertheless, a knowledge deficit that will hamper the 
ability of the technology transfer office to succeed remains. For this reason, I suggest 
supplementing the redesigned technology transfer offices with an entity, or structure, 
that is independent of the university but works in conjunction with it. The entity will 
provide a number of advantages for the university, including creating and fostering 
151. Some universities have implemented some aspects of this model. See, for example, the University 
of Virginia Patent Foundation's graduate student internship program. More information is available at 
http:/ /www.uvapf.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewpage/page _id/1 06?CFID= 1302319&CFTOKEN= 1762 
4305& (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
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relationships between industry and business and providing information to the university 
in the form of analysis of industry, research, and patenting trends. 152 
The UPRC will be charged with first creating and maintaining a database of all 
university patents. The database will be available online, for a fee, to universities and 
industry. However, the UPRC will not simply function as a database administrator or 
aggregator. The UPRC will also provide reports and analyses to universities based on 
data available to, or gathered by, the UPRC, such as information about patenting trends 
or development directions in academia or industry. Different types of organizations 
will have different access rights to the database, as well as to the value-added 
information, such as the trend reports. 
Rather than viewing the system as a simple database, a more apt analogy might be 
a high-level nanny-matching system. In a database model, a nanny-matching system 
may simply allow users to access a list of nannies looking for work or possibly search 
the list based on desired criteria. However, a high-level nanny-matching system would 
provide additional functions beyond just a database. For example, the high-level 
nanny-matching system may provide additional information, such as the results of 
background checks, as well as additional related services, such as paying employment 
taxes on the family's behalf. The system can also provide additional information, 
education, and services for the nanny, such as providing first aid training. 
Furthermore, the high-level nanny-matching system may take advantage of the data 
contained in its database to provide additional data. For example, the system can 
provide information to aspiring nannies in the form of trends for hiring--e.g., perhaps 
the trend in the Northeast United States is toward hiring nannies, while the Midwest 
market for nannies is cooling off, or maybe the trend is toward hiring nannies that have 
college degrees or speak multiple languages. The monetary exchange for this system 
may permit nannies, as the resource-poor party, to insert their data into the database 
for free or for a nominal cost. The seeking family, as the resource-rich party, will be 
charged either a flat fee to search the database of willing nannies and/or may be 
charged a royalty-type amount, such as a finder's fee in the amount of two times the 
nanny's weekly salary, upon hiring the nanny. Another feature is that different users 
may have different access to the database. Members of the general public may have 
limited capabilities to search the database, for example, limited to seeing a truncated 
listing of families seeking nannies and aspiring nannies. Nannies that have paid a 
nominal fee may have greater access to view information about families seeking 
nannies. Similarly, families seeking nannies that have paid a fee may be able to get full 
details on each of the potential employees as well as access to the additional services 
described. 
I propose that the UPRC be a university patent database having similar value-
added, multi-user-level characteristics to the high-level nanny-matching system 
described above. For a nominal fee, the university would be encouraged (or required) 
152. Although this entity shares some resemblance to Ritchie de Larena's proposal, detailed above, the 
value of this proposal is that it does not merely suggest an aggregator or matchmaker between industry and 
academia, but instead provides the valuable information that technology transfer offices do not have ready 
access to. Ritchie de Larena's proposal also addresses the underreporting of patenting by universities under 
the Bayh-Dole Act-a worthy goal, but one not relevant to this paper. 
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to list its patents with the UPRC and in return would be permitted to access the 
database to search for other university research in similar areas. This capability will 
provide the technology transfer office with the ability to do simple patent searching to 
assist with making decisions about filing patent applications on new inventions. In 
fact, depending on how sophisticated the UPRC becomes, it may even offer the service 
of patent searching to universities for an additional fee. Also, with respect to the 
university, the UPRC will provide reports and analyses about trends in patenting by 
universities, as well as trends in industry and research. This information will help the 
technology transfer office have sufficient knowledge to identify potential partners or 
licensees in industry, as well as data to assist with performing the grow-fix-sell triage 
as modified above. For industry, the database of university patents would also be 
available for a cost. Access to the database will permit a business to, in one location, 
be able to identify universities holding patents available for licensing. Other future 
directions for the UPRC may include creating citation networks to identify important 
patents and tracking royalty rates and other industry metrics. 
Between the reorganization of the technology transfer office and the creation of 
the UPRC, the university technology transfer office should be sufficiently equipped to 
perform the required tasks to effectively execute a patent management strategy. If the 
office can get to this stage, where it is regularly, efficiently, and effectively exploiting 
its patent assets, the result should be decreased obstacles to research, the ultimate goal 
of this proposal. 
D. How Does this Proposal Address the Concerns? 
The two obstacles to university research are lack of funding and lack of access. 
At its best, revenue from patent licensing will generate funding, alleviating the funding 
obstacle, which can then be used to bring about improved access, alleviating the access 
obstacle. However, university patents cause concerns in their own right-the fear that 
patenting of foundational research will prohibit innovation and that academic freedom 
is lost in the growing commercialization of university research. My proposal for 
equipping the university technology transfer office with the appropriate staffing and 
the data necessary to implement and execute a patent management strategy addresses 
these obstacles and other concerns on a number of levels. On a superficial level, any 
strategic plan for intellectual property revenue is going to increase the probability of 
receiving a revenue stream because efforts to license become active, rather than 
passive. The key to licensing-finding the right partner-will be aided by the 
revamped technology transfer office staff, as well as by the data and analysis provided 
by the UPRC. As noted above, any increase in licensing revenue will decrease the 
university's lack of funding, because the cost oflicensing is minimal. 
With respect to access, the UPRC will provide vital information about who has 
rights in various technologies and materials required by the university to forward its 
research agenda. By lowering the transaction costs of identifying parties holding 
relevant intellectual property rights, the university will be able to seek licenses, where 
necessary, to permit its research to go forward. Ideally, instead of cash licenses, 
universities will cross-license their research to each other. The UPRC also provides 
the university with data to engage in discussions with members of industry that would 
enhance the collaborative partnership and encourage innovation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although the prevailing wisdom is that university patenting is bad, I argue that if 
done correctly, it can actually be a boon to university research. The main obstacles to 
research are lack of funding and lack of access. Instead of eschewing patents on 
institutional research, the university must patent strategically, like a business, and then 
exploit those patents. In doing so, the university should be able to generate revenue, 
which alleviates both the funding and the access problems. Further, by building a 
portfolio of patents, the university can mitigate the access problems associated with 
patents held by others via cross-licensing opportunities. 
Universities are not strategically pursuing or exploiting their patent rights. In fact, 
many universities do not even have an intellectual property management strategy. The 
first step in creating a plan is to determine what to patent. Next, the university needs 
to determine how to best exploit their assets. By adopting the grow-fix-sell triage of 
businesses to meet the peculiar needs of universities, I believe that universities can in 
fact function like businesses. 
University technology transfer offices, however, are not equipped to behave like 
a business at this point. I argue that two changes can improve the situation. First, the 
technology transfer office needs to be appropriately staffed, which requires the 
employment of at least an attorney and a business person. I further argue that the use 
of graduate students as scientific assistants in the technology transfer office provides 
benefits to the office, in terms of science-knowledgeable employees, as well as to the 
graduate assistant, in terms of being exposed to the patent system and its benefits at an 
early stage in his career. Second, an entity, the UPRC, needs to be established to serve 
as a university patent database and, more importantly, a provider of data reports and 
analyses. This information will help the technology transfer office to make an 
informed decision, based on knowledge of the trends and directions of industry and 
research-information that businesses, by virtue of being "in business," have readily 
available. 
